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Fueling Demand: The Effect of Rebates on Household Purchase of Improved Cookstoves in Rural 
India 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Over one half of the world’s population uses solid and biomass fuels, such as wood and crop 
residues, for cooking and heating (Legros, et al., 2008). Inefficient combustion from solid fuel use 
leads to emission of smoke, particulate matter, and black carbon and is associated with increased 
health risks (Bonjour et. al., 2013), local and global environmental degradation (Grieshop et. al. 2011; 
Ramanathan & Carmichael, 2008), and barriers to household economic development (Wilkinson et. al. 
2009).  
 
Improved cookstoves (ICS) represent a compelling option for decreasing the health, 
environmental, and economic costs associated with solid fuel use (GACC, 2012). ICS draw on clean 
energy sources or improve combustion of solid fuels, which decreases exposure to HAP in 
households and may limit the negative health outcomes in women and children, as well as reducing 
emissions that contribute to climate change (Ramanathan & Carmichael, 2008). Improved fuel 
efficiency suggests that smaller quantities of wood are required for cooking and heating, thus reducing 
each household’s time spent collecting wood and decreasing local deforestation. 
 
However, the challenge in realizing the potential gains from ICS lies in encouraging both 
initial investment and sustained use of ICS technology (Jeuland & Pattanayak, 2012, Ruiz-Mercado et 
al., 2011). Households in rural, low-resource settings, where solid fuel use is high, are often budget 
constrained and have exhibited low demand for ICS and other preventative health technology (Hanna 
et al., 2012, Levine & Cotterman, 2012, Lewis & Pattanayak, 2012, Dupas, 2011). Previous studies 
suggest that the low demand for ICS may be the result of a range of barriers, including inability to pay 
or low willingness to pay for ICS (Levine & Cotterman, 2012), as well as a lack of understanding of 
ICS benefits and use (Shell Foundation, 2013), low trust in new technologies (Miller & Mobarak, 
2011), and poor cultural acceptability (Tronsoco et al., 2007). 
 
Using two rounds of survey data from Duke University’s stove sales randomized control trial 
in rural Uttarakhand, India, I use a household adoption framework to model a household’s decision to 
purchase ICS (Pattanayak & Pfaff, 2009). I specifically examine the effect of a rebate offer in 
incentivizing ICS purchase and additionally consider the influence of local institutional, community, 
and household-level factors associated with a household’s stove purchase decision.  
 
The study’s stove sales intervention targeted key barriers to ICS adoption by incorporating 1) 
information, education, and communication (IEC) activities related to stove benefits and use; 2) a 
choice of two improved stoves, including an electric G-Coil and natural draft Greenway biomass 
stove; 3) an installment plan option, wherein households spread out stove payments over three visits; 
and, 4) a randomly assigned rebate offer, which reduced the price of the stove by one of three-levels, 
and was contingent upon stove use. 
 
Sales results indicate a high demand for ICS among households offered the stove sales 
intervention. In the entirety of the treatment group, 51% of households purchased a stove. Of the 
stove types offered, demand for the electric Gcoil stove was highest, encompassing 70% of the stoves 
sold. Of the group that purchased a stove, 20% purchased a biomass Greenway stove and 10% 
purchased one of each type of stove. Following the intervention, 65% of treatment households owned 
any kind of improved stove, compared with 31% owning an improved stove at baseline. 
 
	  	   	   iii 
The randomized rebate offer shows a positive and highly significant effect on household ICS 
purchase. In all models, the percentage of households purchasing stoves increased as the rebate 
increased (and price paid decreased). At the highest rebate level, 72% of households purchased an 
ICS, with 54% and 27% of households purchasing at the middle and lowest rebates, respectively. 
Further, average marginal effects of the rebate offer on the type of stove purchased indicate that 
assignment to one of the two higher rebate levels causes a household to be more likely to purchase a 
Gcoil electric stove over their traditional stove.  
 
A number of community and household characteristics are significantly correlated with stove 
purchase, giving insight into types of households that may be more likely to adopt ICS. Examination 
of the role of local NGOs in a community introduces a nearly 16% increase in stove purchase 
suggesting the importance of understanding local institutions in ICS service delivery.  Additional 
analyses demonstrate the influence of a household’s use of savings and credit, finding that rebate’s 
effect on stove purchase is significantly higher among households that lack experience with savings.  
 
This analysis finds that there is a high demand for improved stoves, especially with substantial 
‘use-related’ rebates. Deliberate experimentation with various rebates provides further understanding 
of price elasticities, which may guide planning and marketing. However, further focus is needed in 
building a reliable supply of ICS, especially given the challenging environments that small market-
based approaches to ICS distribution face in developing countries. When further challenged with low 
ICS demand and a market distorted by subsidies, local market-based supply chains may flounder. This 
study’s findings suggest that NGOs may serve as an important institutional complement to market-
based supply that leverages local networks of trust and contextual knowledge.  
 
 
	  	   	   1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over one half of the world’s population uses solid and biomass fuels, such as wood and crop 
residues, for cooking and heating (Legros, et al., 2008). Inefficient combustion from solid fuel use 
leads to emission of smoke, particulate matter, and black carbon and is associated with increased 
health risks (Bonjour et. al., 2013), local and global environmental degradation (Grieshop et. al. 2011; 
Ramanathan & Carmichael, 2008), and barriers to household economic development (Wilkinson et. al. 
2009).  
 
Solid fuel use contributes to Household Air Pollution (HAP), which represents the third 
largest contributor to the global burden of disease worldwide (Lim, et al. 2012). HAP exposure is 
higher among women and children (Bates, 2013) leading to increased negative health outcomes, 
including Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI), Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), and 
cardiovascular diseases (Kurmi, et. al. 2010). Disease incidence from solid fuel use is occurs in high 
solid fuel use regions, concentrated in developing countries of the world (Figure 1) where access to 
and experience with modern fuels is limited (Legros et. al., 2008).  
 
Community, regional, and global environmental costs result from reliance on biomass fuel use 
(Wilkinson, et al., 2009). Collection of biomass induces local deforestation, loss of biodiversity 
(Grieshop, 2011) and contributes to outdoor air pollution (Ramanathan & Carmichael, 2008). Burning 
solid fuels, even at a household level, contributes to ozone depletion and global climate change 
through emission of greenhouse gases (Ramanathan & Carmichael, 2008). Further, black carbon 
emissions, which absorbs UV light, can lead to solar heating and glacial melt at high elevations 
(Ramanthan & Feng, 2008), as well as decreased agricultural yields (Venkataraman, 2010).  
 
Dependence on solid fuels for cooking also elicits time and monetary costs. The burden of 
solid fuel collection falls on women and children, who often must divert involvement in other 
activities that could enhance economic livelihoods or social growth, such as education (Kohlin et al, 
2011). Further, fuel collection may occur over significant distances, exposing household members to 
increased personal safety risks. Additionally, households face growing monetary costs if purchasing 
fuel (Dalberg, 2013), which further constrains already limited household budgets. 
 
Thus, improved cookstoves (ICS) represent a compelling option for decreasing the health, 
environmental, and economic costs associated with solid fuel use (GACC, 2012).1 Improved stoves 
draw on clean energy sources or improve combustion of solid fuels, which limited evidence suggests 
decreases exposure to HAP in households and may limit the negative health outcomes in women and 
children, as well as reducing emissions that contribute to climate change (Ramanathan & Carmichael, 
2008). Improved fuel efficiency suggests that smaller quantities of wood are required for cooking and 
heating, thus reducing each household’s time spent collecting wood and decreasing local deforestation. 
 
However, the challenge in realizing the potential gains from ICS lies in encouraging both 
initial investment and sustained use of ICS technology (Jeuland & Pattanayak, 2012, Ruiz-Mercado et 
al., 2011). Households in rural, low-resource settings, where solid fuel use is high, are often budget 
constrained and have exhibited low demand for ICS and other preventative health technology (Hanna 
et al., 2012, Levine & Cotterman, 2012, Lewis & Pattanayak, 2012, Dupas, 2011). Previous studies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  ICS, as defined in this analysis, includes any improved clean stove, including kerosene, LPG, and electric. 
Cleaner burning stoves using, such as those that use LPG and kerosene, offer air quality benefits beyond stoves 
that burn biomass and solid fuels (Grieshop et al., 2011).  Electric stoves also represent a clean-burning option, 
though accrue additional energy costs (Lewis and Pattanayak, 2012) that may incur increased household fuel 
costs, as well as additional environmental costs associated with electricity generation.  
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suggest that the low demand for ICS may be the result of a range of barriers, including inability to pay 
or low willingness to pay for ICS (Levine & Cotterman, 2012), as well as a lack of understanding of 
ICS benefits and use (Shell Foundation, 2013), low trust in new technologies (Miller & Mobarak, 
2011), and poor cultural acceptability (Tronsoco et al., 2007). 
 
In this analysis, I incorporate a household adoption framework to understand a household’s 
decision to purchase ICS, a key precursor to long-term sustained use of clean cooking technology. 
This framework models a household’s decision to purchase ICS through a calculus of marginal 
benefits and costs (Pattanayak & Pfaff, 2009). Budget-constrained rural households may weigh time, 
monetary, and knowledge costs against the potential long-term health and time-savings benefits of 
ICS, all of which depend on a household’s heterogeneous experiences, perceptions, and 
characteristics.  Using data from a stove sales randomized control trial that includes a novel financing 
offer in rural India (Pattanayak et al., 2012), I use this framework to specifically examine the effect of a 
rebate offer in incentivizing ICS purchase. Additionally, I consider the influence of local institutional, 
community, and household-level factors associated with a household’s stove purchase decision. 
 
India presents an important context in which to understand ICS demand. With a very large 
population that relies on solid-fuels and suffers from HAP-related illness, the potential for gains 
through widespread ICS adoption are large (Legros et al., 2008). In India, roughly 400 million people 
are exposed to indoor air pollution associated with solid fuel use, causing over 875 thousand deaths 
annually (Dalberg, 2013).  Further, recent policy changes signal India’s readiness to embrace clean 
energy development; The Indian Biomass Cookstove Initiative, enacted in 2009, aims to provide low-
income households with access to clean cooking options on a national scale (Venkataraman, 2010). 
 
Figure 1. Global Incidence of Acute Respiratory Illness (DALYs per 100,000 people) 
 
 
(World Health Organization, 2010) 
 
II. LITERATURE 
 
Given the low demand for ICS and other environmental health technologies, targeting a wide 
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variety of price and non-price household barriers to purchase, as well as stimulating demand may be 
necessary to encourage uptake and sustained use (Meredith, et al., 2013; Dalberg, 2013). For example, 
a recent systematic review shows that the effectiveness of social marketing strategies that target the 
four “Ps” of price, place, product and promotion for improving demand for water and sanitation 
products in developing countries (Evans et al., 2014). Bailis et al. (2009) contend that the few, large-
scale successful ICS dissemination programs currently in existence have all leveraged business 
principles and market-based approaches to solving ICS challenges.  
 
Costly investments in ICS present a challenge to budget constrained households (Pattanayak 
& Pfaff, 2009). Given these constraints, stove price may play a large role in a household’s initial 
decision to replace a traditional mud or three-stone stove, a “free” technology, and invest in a more 
expensive stove option (Jeuland & Pattanayak, 2012, Rehman, et al., 2008). Evidence suggests price 
changes may stimulate household purchase of ICS technology, as demand for environmental health 
technology in low-resource countries is highly price-elastic (Dupas, 2011; Miller & Mobarak, 2011; 
Beyene, et al., 2012). 
 
Table 1. Existing ICS-specific adoption studies using novel finance offers to promote technology 
purchase 
Author/Year Location Rural/
Urban 
Design Sample size Finance offer Adoption 
rate 
Miller & Mobarak, 
2011 
Bangladesh Rural Experimental 2280  
households 
Subsidy: 50% stove 
price 
7%  
Levine & 
Cotterman, 2012 
Uganda Rural Experimental 355  
households 
Free trial & 
installments (3) 
46% 
Silk, et al., 2012 Kenya Rural Experimental 5868 
households 
Subsidy: ~25% 8% 
 
 Subsidized prices, such as rebates or other novel financing, target this price sensitivity and 
encourage household investment in environmental health products (Lagarde, et al., 2012; Cole et al, 
2012). However, few studies have generated nuanced preventative health or ICS-specific findings 
related to subsidies’ effects on stove purchase (Table 1). The few existing ICS studies demonstrate low 
demand for ICS in a variety of contexts and limited efficacy of finance offers to stimulate adoption of 
improved cookstoves, with household adoption rates varying between seven and 46 percent. Several 
studies further suggest that without subsidized ICS dissemination, the poorest households would not 
adopt clean stove technology, as other household needs are often prioritized (Rehfuess, 2014). 
 
 A household’s time preferences can also impact investments in preventative health 
technologies (Rehfuess, 2014). For example, “impatient” households who prefer immediate outcomes 
may be unwilling to purchase ICS because some returns on investment, such as health or 
environmental benefits, are realized many years in the future, or are not always apparent (Atmadja et 
al., 2012). Further, time preferences may also determine household liquidity and savings, which affect 
a household’s ability to purchase an improved cookstove. Individuals who prefer to spend money on 
consumption or leisure spending today are likely to lack cash-in-hand for relatively large purchases, 
such as improved cookstoves, in the future. Therefore, spreading payments out over time through 
installments may increase some households’ ability or willingness to pay for ICS.  
 
 Households may additionally be reluctant to invest in new technologies, such as ICS, if they 
are inexperienced or have a low level of trust in the stove’s benefits or the sales offer. Thus, most 
demand promotion campaigns try to give households information with different combinations of 
education, information, and communication strategies (Hamoudi et al., 2012). Specifically, receiving 
information from a trusted local community institution, such as a local grassroots NGO, may 
influence reluctant households to invest in ICS and other similar products like pit latrines (Pattanayak 
et al., 2009). For example, Cole et al. (2012) and Levine & Cotterman (2011) test the notion that that 
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‘trust matters’ and find that when endorsed by a local institution or village leader, preventative services 
and products are significantly more likely to be purchased.  
  
  Local grassroots NGOs, institutions which work closely in and with local communities to 
further development, enable the service delivery of community programs and may play a key role in 
facilitating adoption of improved cookstoves. Firstly, local NGOs build influence in a community 
through establishing social trust (Islam, et al. 2011) and may improve long-term sustainability of an 
intervention, particularly if the organization has held a long-standing presence in the community 
(Alsop, 2005).  Secondly, NGOs hold great contextual knowledge of local practices (Watkins, 2012, 
Alsop, 2005, Islam, 2011) enabling them to position behavior change in a way that a more distant 
government agency (Devi, 2013). Though empirical studies relating NGO and CBO implementation 
to cookstoves and environmental health interventions are rare, growing evidence of NGO 
implemented health programs shows the promise of NGOs in facilitating successful interventions 
(Watkins et al., 2012). Quasi-experimental studies show improved equity and coverage of government-
sponsored health programs when implemented through contracted NGOs by delivering improved 
decentralized access (Bhushan, et al., 2002) and increased training and oversight (Baqui et al., 2008). 
Finally, heterogeneity of NGO visions and approaches may lead to different strategies and outcomes 
for ICS promotion (Troncoso et al., 2011). Understanding the nuances of NGO implementation is 
critical to understanding optimal service delivery, as well as strengthening social capital and 
community empowerment (Islam et al., 2011). 
  
 There are many community-level context and household-specific characteristics that may be 
influential in driving purchase of cookstoves (Lewis & Pattanayak, 2012, Refuess, 2014). Higher socio-
economic status, which is often measured using household head’s education level and household 
wealth (or assets), have been and continue to be important characteristics of likely cookstove adopters 
(Rehfuess et al., 2014, Miller & Mobarak, 2011). Household income and proxies for wealth, such as 
household size, are often correlated with ICS purchase (Levine et al., 2010). Presence of other health-
risk avoidance technologies, such as water filters or improved toilets, may signal a willingness to invest 
in additional risk avoidance (Pattanayak & Pfaff, 2009). Access to credit and banking services may be 
an additional determinant of cookstove adoption based on household ability to pay for a stove, or 
willingness and comfort to engage in a financing offer (Alem, et al. 2013). 
 
III. EXPERIMENT & DATA COLLECTION 
 
I use experimental data to test some of the theories of demand promotion discussed in the 
previous section. Specifically, the data used in this analysis comes from an experiment and two rounds 
of surveys that were part of Duke University’s TRAction study on adoption of ICS in rural India 
(Pattanayak et al., 2012). The baseline survey data were collected in July and August 2012 by trained 
enumerators. The intervention was carried out from August to December 2013 (some intervention 
activities are ongoing) with a group randomly selected from the survey sample in the state of 
Uttarakhand in the lower Himalayas.  
 
As previous exposure to institutional NGO intervention is a key interest of the study, 
communities in the two districts of Bageshwar and Nanital were stratified by the presence of a local, 
grassroots NGO (Chirag). Therefore, villages were selected into the survey sample by considering 
villages with Chirag presence that could be matched to villages without Chirag presence along several 
census characteristics. Nearest-neighbor propensity score matching was used to match “Chirag 
villages” with “non-Chirag villages”, similar to previous studies using pre-evaluation matching to 
examine water interventions in low-resource settings (Pattanayak et al., 2010). Village sub-clusters 
were delineated as small, medium or large population size. Of the 38 cluster communities identified, 
106 geographically distinct sub-cluster hamlets or villages were identified, from which 1050 
households were surveyed.  
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Households in each village were randomly selected at baseline using the right hand rule and 
by counting off every nth household. The nth number was established by village size, dividing the 
population by 13, but not exceeding every 8th household. Additional divisions were made in each sub-
cluster to ensure spatial variation.  Small, medium, and large sub-clusters received 20, 30, and 40 
surveys, respectively. In the case where a household was unavailable, a neighboring household was 
randomly selected.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, Intervention group (N=771) 
 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
Household size 771 4.78 2.07 5 1 14 
Total # rooms in 
house 
768 4.70 2.48 4 1 22 
Monthly HH 
expenditure (Rs.) 
749 5729 5124 5000 0 70,000 
Improved primary 
water source 
771 .63 .48 1 0 1 
Presence of toilet  771 .84 .37 1 0 1 
Household owns 
mobile phone 
771 .83 .38 1 0 1 
Owns/leases 
agricultural land  
753 .98 .125 1 0 1 
Education, Head of 
HH (years) 
757 4.85 4.53 6 0 18 
Education, Primary 
Cook (years) 
752 4.65 4.46 5 0 18 
Minutes per day 
spent cooking 
(traditional stove) 
771 287.09 146.34 240 0 1440 
Minutes per day 
spent cooking 
(improved stove, 
including LPG) 
771 47.26 95.06 0 0 600 
Household owns 
improved stove (not 
including LPG)  
753 .32 .47 0 0 1 
HH has taken loan in 
past year 
771 .16 .37 0 0 1 
HH saved money at 
MFI or bank in past 
year 
771 .11 .31 0 0 1 
Hours of electricity 
per day  
740 16.99 7.27 20 0 24 
HH believes ICS has 
medium or better 
impact  
771 .30 .46 0 0 1 
% of HH sick in past 
2 weeks 
771 .08 .19 0 0 1 
Presence of transit 
facilities 
764 .57 .50 1 0 1 
Presence of NGO  771 .53 .50 1 0 1 
 
The baseline survey was conducted with the primary cook or head of household.  The survey 
instrument asked respondents about perceptions, existing knowledge, and use of cookstoves 
(improved and traditional) including relevant fuels; household members’ demographics including 
education, health, previous illness and experience with respiratory diseases; and household 
socioeconomic characteristics. An additional community questionnaire that was administered to the 
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village leader or pradhan in each Gram Panchayat’s revenue village collected information on 
community characteristics, such as infrastructure, organizations, and demographics. 
 
The intervention, implemented approximately 15 months after baseline, was offered to 771 
households in the treatment group, all of which had been surveyed at baseline in 70 sub-cluster 
hamlets.2 The randomization was successful; key household characteristics were balanced (statistically 
insignificantly different) across different arms of randomization (see Appendix, Table A.2). 
 
Table 3. TRAction Intervention: Stove Costs and Rebate Offers 
Stove Type Traditional Greenway 
(biomass fuel) 
G-Coil 
(electric) 
Stove Cost  
(INR/US$) 
Rs. 0 
$0 
Rs. 900 
$18 
Rs. 1300 
$26 
Stove cost as % of 
average monthly 
household expenditure 
 
0% 
 
15.7% 
 
22.7% 
 
Rebate level Rebate 1 Rebate 2 Rebate 3 
Subsidy (INR) Rs. 25 Rs. 200 Rs. 320 or Rs. 460 
(1/3 of stove cost) 
Subsidy (US$) US$ .50 US$4 US$ 6.50 or US$ 8.75 
 
TRAction intervention activities were informed by baseline survey analysis, existing literature 
and empirical evidence, as well as a series of carefully designed pilot interventions. Elements targeting 
key barriers to ICS adoption were tested in small-scale pilot programs in eight villages in three 
different Indian states, including Uttarakhand (Lewis et al., 2014). Inclusion of information, education, 
communication (IEC) activities, such as viewing a stove use demonstration and intensive social 
marketing, led to significant increases in household purchase of ICS. Experimentation of stove sales 
offers including stove return, installment plans, and rebate offers showed highest uptake by combining 
installment and rebate offers. Finally, several models of manufactured ICS were additionally offered in 
pilots, with results indicating greatest interest in electric stoves over natural draft biomass-fueled 
stoves, when they were offered together. 
 
Households in villages randomly selected for intervention received stove sales offers 
comprised of four main components targeting known barriers to ICS adoption (Figure 2).  
 
1. Households received a promotional pamphlet detailing attributes of improved stoves and 
features, including fuel and time-savings, costs of operation, and costs of stoves, as well as a 
demonstration of use of improved stoves.  
2. A choice of two stoves was offered to households, a natural-draft, improved biomass stove, 
the Greenway Smart Stove, and the G-Coil electric stove. Households were permitted to buy 
up to two stoves and were able to purchase one of each, if desired.  
3. Households were given an installment plan option, wherein they spread out stove payments 
over three visits, making payments smaller and further apart.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It is important to note that 128 households in the treatment group were not offered the rebates because they 
either refused to participate in the sales offer or the dwelling was empty. Of the households that refused the 
offer, 43 households were in communities with an NGO presence. Rebates have been randomly assigned to 
these households for this analysis. As with the overall randomization, we assume a similar random distribution 
for the households that refused the offer. 
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4. Households were randomly assigned one of three rebate offers, reducing the cost of the stove 
by 25 INR (US$.50), 200 INR (US$4), or one-third of the cost of the stove, referred to as an 
average discount of approximately 400 INR (US$8).  
 
Households purchasing more than one stove used the rebate offer only once. Trained stoves sales 
teams, recruited and trained through NGO partner, Chirag, collected all data on stove purchases. At 
the time of intervention, treatment households were given brief surveys that asked respondents about 
stoves in use and reasons for purchasing or not purchasing the stoves being sold. Table 2 shows the 
stove costs and subsidies given at each rebate level during the intervention. 
 
Figure 2. Features of stove sales intervention 
 
 
 
III. ESTIMATING MODELS 
 
 Because rebates were randomly assigned at the household level, I assume that rebate levels are 
uncorrelated with characteristics of the household, which allows for a causal estimation of the 
treatment effect. I conduct balance tests to compare means of several variables for treatment and 
control groups (and rebate-levels), using a normalized difference metric. As shown in Table A1 and 
A2 (Appendix), the sub-samples in each group are balanced; i.e., the normalized difference for each of 
the key variables is less than the threshold of |0.25|. The only exception is a variable measuring 
transit facilities, which does not present a great concern, but may indicate a small degree of 
community-level access differences. Households included in this sample received an approximately 
equal distribution of each rebate level, as demonstrated by Table A3 (Appendix). 
 
 To examine the treatment effect of the rebate offer on probability of stove purchase, I use 
probit regressions. First, I use a simple specification linking exogenous rebate assignment to 
probability of ICS purchase, where Rebate2 represents the payment of Rs. 200 and Rebate3 represents 
one-third of the cost of the stove (Rs. 300 – Rs. 460), compared to receiving the nominal rebate of Rs. 
25 (1.1). In this and following models, each rebate level is represented by a binary indicator variable. 
 
Yi = β0 + β1Rebate2i + β2Rebate3i +εi   (1.1) 
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Second, I examine if specific baseline household characteristics (W) are correlated with the 
probability of ICS purchase.  
 
Yi = β0 + β1Rebate2i + β2Rebate3i  + β3Wi + εi  (1.2) 
Third, I consider the effect of rebate assignment on the choice of stove type purchased (Gcoil 
or Greenway) using multinomial logistic regression. Whittington et al. (2002) provide an example of 
using such models to examine rural household choice between different kinds of environmental health 
technologies in the South Asian context. 
 
Yij = β0 + β1Rebate25ij + β2Rebate200ij +εij   (1.3) 
To examine the role of local grassroots NGOs I first examine the role of a local grassroots 
NGO presence independently.  
 
Yi = β0 + β1NGO+εij     (2.1) 
Incorporating a vector of baseline household characteristics, V, I examine correlations of 
household and community-level factors, and NGO presence with probability of ICS purchase. 
 
Yi = β0 + β1NGO + β2Rebate2i + β3Rebate3i + β4Vi  + εi   (2.2) 
Further, I examine the joint influence of rebates and NGO presence by including interaction 
terms. 
Yi = β0 + β1NGO + β2Rebate2i + β3Rebate3i + β4Rebate2i* NGO + β5Rebate3i*NGO  + εi (2.3) 
 
 
Yi = β0 + β1NGO + β2Rebate2i + β3Rebate3i + β4Vi  + εi       P(Y|NGO) (2.4)  
I use multinomial logistic regression to estimate the effect rebate assignment and NGO 
presence in a community on purchase of stove type. 
 
Yij = β0 + β1NGOij +εij     (2.5) 
Next, given the potential importance of credit and liquidity constraints, I consider the impact 
of two household financial decisions in the past year: (a) saving in a financial institution, and (b) taking 
a loan. First, I examine the independent influence of households saving and credit use on probability 
of stove purchase (3.1).  
 
Yi = β0 + β1Save + β2Credit + εi   (3.1) 
Second, I include a vector of household characteristics, T .  
Yi = β0 + β1Save + β2Credit + β3Rebate2i + β4Rebate3i + β5Ti  + εi  (3.2)  
Third, I examine the impact of household saving in the past year jointly with the exogenous 
rebate assignment using interaction terms (3.3) and again with those households that have using credit 
in the past year (3.4). 
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Yi = β0 + β1Save + β2Rebate2i + β3Rebate3i + β4Rebate2i* Save + β5Rebate3i*Save  + εi  (3.3) 
Yi = β0 + β1Credit + β2Rebate2i + β3Rebate3i + β4Rebate2i*Credit + β5Rebate3i*Credit + εi (3.4) 
Fourth, I conduct sub-sample analyses of vectors of HH characteristics, P and Q, and their 
influence on stove purchase in sub-populations conditioned by saving in the past year (3.5) or taking a 
loan in the past year (3.6). 
 
Yi = β0 + β1Save + β2Rebate2i + β3Rebate3i + β4Pi  + εi       P(Y|Save)  (3.5a-b)  
Yi = β0 + β1Credit + β2Rebate2i + β3Rebate3i + β4Qi  + εi       P(Y|Credit) (3.6a-b)  
Finally, I again use multinomial logistic regression to model the association of savings and 
loan behavior on the choice of stove type. 
 
Yij = β0 + β1Saveij + β2Creditij + εij   (3.7) 
For all regression analyses, I used clustered standard errors at the sub-cluster, or village, level, 
as treatment assignment was determined at this administrative level. 
 
 
 
IV. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
 Sales results indicate a high demand for ICS among households offered the stove sales 
intervention. In the entirety of the treatment group, 51% of households purchased a stove. Of the 
stove types offered, demand for the electric Gcoil stove was highest, encompassing 70% of the stoves 
sold. Of the group that purchased a stove, 20% purchased a biomass Greenway stove and 10% 
purchased one of each type of stove. Following the intervention, 65% of treatment households owned 
any kind of improved stove, compared with 31% owning an improved stove at baseline. 
 
Rebates 
 
The randomized rebate assignment allows me to causally link the rebate offer and a 
household’s probability of purchasing ICS.  As Figure 3 demonstrates, the percentage of households 
purchasing stoves increased as the rebate increased (and price paid decreased). At the highest rebate 
level, 72% of households purchased an ICS, with 54% and 27% of households purchasing at the 
middle and lowest rebates, respectively. The sales at each price allow us to trace out a demand curve 
for ICS (Figure 4). Multivariate regression results show that the average marginal effects of the rebates 
exhibit a similar pattern (Table 4, models 1.1-1.2); the regression coefficients of the second and third 
highest rebate levels are statistically significantly correlated with a higher probability of ICS purchase.  
 
The rebate offered in the sales intervention effectively gave households a delayed subsidy, 
which both induced a price shock to households, such that the cost of the stove decreased, and 
encouraged households to experiment and become familiar with the stove, as the rebate offer was 
contingent upon observable use on the third visit. In the context of the household production 
framework previously described, the rebate offer’s positive effect on ICS adoption is as expected. That 
is, rebates promote experimentation, which reduces knowledge costs associated with use of ICS, and 
larger rebates substantially decrease the monetary costs of purchasing the health-risk avoidance 
technology, proportionally inducing ICS adoption. 
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As additional household level controls are added (Table 4, model 1.2), the magnitude and 
significance of the rebate becomes stronger, further highlighting the effect of the rebate offer. By 
controlling for household characteristics associated with ICS adoption, I am likely accounting for 
factors negatively associated with household purchase. For example, an increase in percentage of 
household members sick in the past two weeks with cough or cold is negatively associated with ICS 
purchase. 
 
 
Figure 3. Stove purchase by rebate  
 
Rebate                    Rs. 4003              Rs. 200                            Rs. 25 
Stove price4             Rs. 600              Rs. 700                        Rs. 875 
 
 
A number of community and household characteristics are significantly correlated with stove 
purchase, giving insight into types of households that may be more likely to adopt ICS. For example, 
households that owned improved stoves at baseline and those using improved water sources show a 
positive and significant probability of stove purchase, suggesting that houses that have made 
investments in air and water quality are more likely to invest in additional environmental health-risk 
avoidance by purchasing ICS. Additionally, households with constant access to electricity are 
significantly associated with probability of ICS purchase; 43% of treatment households with constant 
access (n=177) purchased a Gcoil electric stove. However, electricity access is significantly correlated 
with household expenditure, suggesting that its relationship with increased ICS purchase may also be 
accounting for high SES households (Table A4, Appendix).  
 
Average marginal effects of the rebate offer on the type of stove purchased indicate that 
assignment to one of the two higher rebate levels causes a household to be more likely to purchase a 
Gcoil electric stove over their traditional stove (Table 6, model 1.3). This effect grows in strength and 
significance as the rebate level increases from Rs. 200 to Rs. 400. This result suggests that households 
receiving the higher rebate may be likelier to purchase Gcoil stoves because, while less expensive than 
the Greenway stove, they may perceive that higher initial subsidies will help to allay electricity costs of 
Gcoil use. Note, all households were told that the energy bill will increase because of the electric stove 
use.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Highest rebate level (Rs. 400) reflects an average rebate based on one-third of stove cost for stoves of different 
prices (Greenway biomass: Rs. 1300 and Gcoil electric: Rs. 900). 
4 Stove prices reflect purchase of Gcoil electric stove.  
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Figure 4. Demand curve for ICS purchase by stove price/rebate level5 
 
	   	  
 
NGO Presence 
 
 As Figure 5 demonstrates, the role of local NGOs in a community introduces a nearly 16% 
increase in stove purchase. However, the role of NGOs may hold further importance when 
considering whether households entertained the stove sales offer, that is, opened their doors and 
heard out the sales team. Among households that refused to participate in the stove sales offer 
(N=128), 65% were in communities without NGO presence. Thus, the NGO may have played a role 
in encouraging households to be open to the stove sales offer initially. Among households who agreed 
to hear the stove sales offer, 56% were in communities with an NGO presence.  
 
 Results from Model 2.1 show that the presence of a local grassroots NGO increased the 
probability of stove purchase (Table 4, model 2.1). However, when interacting NGO presence with 
rebate level (Table 4, model 2.2), the joint effect is not statistically significant. This suggests that the 
NGO did not alter how price sensitive or insensitive the households were, or at least the sample was 
not powered to detect that effect. In the multinomial logit model for stove choice (Table 6, model 
2.5), the presence of an NGO shows a highly significant and slightly positive effect of NGO presence 
on purchase of both Greenway and Gcoil stoves, as compared with traditional stove ownership. This 
result supports the notion that households with a trusted NGO may trust the sales offer and promise 
of stove benefits. 	  
 
 To gain further insight into the role of a local NGO, I conduct sub-sample analyses of the 
treatment group by presence of an NGO (Table 4, model 2.4a-b). As in other models, the positive 
sign and significant effect of the rebate on stove purchase increases proportionally as the stove price 
decreases, however, at the highest rebate level it has a 20% larger effect in communities with an NGO 
presence than those that do not have an NGO present. Additionally, the effect of the rebate is slightly 
smaller for the medium rebate level in communities that have an NGO present. The striking 
differences between communities at the highest rebate level suggest that NGOs may engender a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Stove prices reflect purchase of Gcoil electric stove. 
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higher trust or willingness to engage in a financial offer when it represents a substantial decrease in 
price. Households in communities with NGOs may be accustomed to sales offers of social goods and 
are therefore only willing to accept those that offer them the best deal available, with the 
understanding that this may not be their only opportunity to invest in household health technology, if 
not offered the highest discount. 
 
 
Figure 5. Stove Purchase and Stove Type by presence of NGO	  
	  
	  
In the group that does not have an NGO present (40% of sample), improved water source, 
use of credit in past year, and ownership of an improved stove at baseline are all positive and 
significant predictors of improved stove purchase. Among this group, the percent of household 
members experiencing cold or cough in the past two weeks at baseline, is also significant. In areas 
where the NGO is present, villages of larger populations and constant access to electricity are positive 
and significantly related to ICS purchase. 
 
Characteristics associated with stove purchase in villages without an NGO present shed light on 
factors that may be important to household investment decision-making in the absence of trust in a 
sales offer.  The significance of previous experience with respiratory sickness and environmental 
health technology among villages with no NGO presence indicates that households may be balancing 
the perceived risks of investment in a new preventative health technology with the known risks of 
household sickness or known benefits of technology investment. Thus, households may be making 
decisions based on experience where trusted informants’ advice on purchase decisions is not available. 
Ownership of improved stove is a particularly strong predictor of ICS purchase (99% confidence 
interval) suggesting that direct experience with ICS may dramatically increase probability of 
purchasing additional ICS. Finally, household use of credit in the past year is strongly and highly 
significantly associated with stove purchase, suggesting that when a trusted institution is lacking, 
previous experience with credit and payments over time may make a household more willing to 
engage in a similar finance offer, such as the rebate and time payment components of the intervention. 
 
This sub-sample analysis, first, demonstrates that different factors may be influential in 
encouraging stove uptake when a trusted local institution is promoting ICS, and second, suggests 
more about the role of an NGO in a community. Where NGOs are present, the significance and 
positive association with larger villages suggests that villages with greater numbers of households may 
rely more heavily on institutions as sources of trust when investing in health technology than smaller 
villages, which may rely upon tightly-knit social networks.  
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Savings and Credit 
 
 Household savings and credit can be significant potential factors in predicting stove purchase. 
In theory, household savings and credit access should decrease liquidity constraints, a hypothesized 
barrier to ICS purchase. Results of Model 3.1 show that both household savings and credit use in the 
past year were positively and significantly correlated with ICS purchase (Table 5, model 3.1). 
Introduction of the rebate offer, along with other household characteristics (Table 5, model 3.2), 
decreases the strength of the positive association between the effect of savings and credit on ICS 
purchase, but remains significant at the 85% confidence level. 
 
Interaction of the rebate offer and household savings (Table 4, model 3.3) demonstrates that 
the joint effects of the highest rebate offer and savings is significant and negatively associated to ICS 
purchase. A post-estimation test suggests that inclusion of interaction terms for both rebate levels is 
significant (99% confidence level), suggesting that joint inclusion adds explanatory strength to the 
model. The negative and significant correlation of the savings and rebate interaction term may indicate 
that households who are engaged in savings may be less affected by monetary incentives, given that 
their household access to cash is presumably greater than those who do not save. 
 
In a sub-sample analysis of households that did not report saving money at a bank or formal 
financial institution in the past year at baseline (89% of the sample), the rebates are strongly correlated 
with ICS purchase and increase at each rebate level. This finding builds upon that found in model 3.3, 
demonstrating that non-saver households who receive a higher rebate are highly likely to purchase an 
ICS, whereas saver households are less likely to purchase ICS simply due of the rebate. The idea that a 
house with no savings history and that may lack cash-on-hand may be more likely to take advantage of 
the subsidized price of the rebate offer supports findings in other environmental health technology 
studies, which suggest the importance of targeting household liquidity constraints.  
 
Households that did save in the past year do not yield significant rebate estimates, which may 
in part due to low sample size and statistical power. However, in households that save, those that 
identify as scheduled castes and scheduled tribes6 (SC/ST) are significantly less likely to purchase 
improved stoves. This result may be due to the strong ties to traditional behaviors, such as cooking 
practices, making ICS adoption a highly challenging adjustment to a long-standing cultural practice. 
Additionally, in households that report saving in the past year, years of head of household education 
becomes significant (99% confidence level), suggesting that increased education, which may facilitate 
increased knowledge of health and improved understanding of ICS benefits, may improve a 
household’s likelihood to purchase ICS.  
 
A sub-sample analysis of households that took a loan in the past year and those who have not 
(Table 5, model 3.6a-b) reveals that household use of credit and receiving a high rebate offer makes a 
large difference in increasing probability of ICS purchase. Households that use credit may be more 
trusting or comfortable with engaging in a finance offer with an external institution, such as our 
partner NGO, Chirag. Further, households that do not use credit also show significant positive 
association of large household size with ICS purchase. The significance of the number of household 
members may be capturing an income effect, as large households often reflect a household’s greater 
economic capacity to care for many people. Households that do use credit show a positive and 
significant association of primary cook education with ICS purchase, signifying that increased 
exposure and knowledge of the household’s female leader may also contribute to ICS adoption. As 
past studies have shown, women traditionally prioritize household purchasing decisions to improve 
household health over those decisions made by men.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Scheduled caste and scheduled tribal populations are historically disadvantaged and isolated groups that may 
still have low socio-economic and educational statuses (Government of India, 2014). 
	  	   	   14 
  
Table 4. Average Marginal Effects on Probability of Stove Purchase  
 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4a 2.4b 
      No 
NGO 
NGO 
                
Rebate 2  0.71*** 0.79***  0.72*** 0.79*** 0.80*** 0.74*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Rebate 3  1.20*** 1.33***  1.04*** 1.33*** 1.22*** 1.43*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Village Size  0.14   0.13 0.11 0.18 
  (0.14)   (0.15) (0.54) (0.09) 
Improved water source  0.28*   0.30* 0.54* 0.05 
  (0.03)   (0.02) (0.02) (0.70) 
Household has saved in past week  0.28   0.26 0.20 0.17 
  (0.12)   (0.14) (0.51) (0.45) 
Household has taken loan in past year  0.20   0.21 0.45* 0.01 
  (0.15)   (0.14) (0.02) (0.94) 
SHG  0.17   0.13 0.19 0.17 
  (0.25)   (0.37) (0.42) (0.33) 
Improved Stove (non-LPG)  0.82*   0.80* 1.36** 0.49 
  (0.03)   (0.03) (0.01) (0.31) 
Household has constant access to 
electricity 
 0.26*   0.26* 0.16 0.36* 
  (0.03)   (0.03) (0.30) (0.04) 
SC/ST  -0.07   -0.09 -0.01 -0.21 
  (0.55)   (0.45) (0.98) (0.19) 
Total Monthly Expenditure  -0.00   -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.85)   (0.87) (0.51) (0.48) 
Number of household members  0.06*   0.05* 0.05 0.04 
  (0.03)   (0.04) (0.22) (0.26) 
% of household sick in past two weeks  -0.43   -0.43 -0.75* -0.10 
  (0.08)   (0.09) (0.02) (0.83) 
Years of Education, Household head  0.01   0.01 0.00 0.02 
  (0.27)   (0.26) (0.85) (0.19) 
Years of Education, Primary Cook  -0.01   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.42)   (0.40) (0.68) (0.63) 
NGO   0.26 0.16 0.15   
   (0.07) (0.48) (0.31)   
NGO*Rebate 2    -0.02    
    (0.93)    
NGO*Rebate 3    0.31    
    (0.23)    
Constant -0.62*** -1.53*** -0.13 -0.70*** -1.57*** -1.57** -1.43*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        
Joint test (Chi)    5.10    
    (0.17)    
Observations 771 722 771 771 722 338 384 
Robust pval in parentheses        
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05        
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Table 5. Average Marginal Effects on Probability of Stove Purchase (Savings/Credit) 
 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5a 3.5b 3.6a 3.6b 
     save no save credit no credit 
                 
Rebate 2   0.79*** 0.75*** 0.67*** 0.24 0.86*** 1.21** 0.78*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.60) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Rebate 3   1.33*** 1.27*** 1.14*** 0.38 1.43*** 1.80*** 1.28*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Village Size  0.14   0.15 0.15 0.02 0.15 
  (0.14)   (0.46) (0.12) (0.89) (0.15) 
Improved water source  0.28*   0.50 0.30* 0.58 0.23 
  (0.03)   (0.17) (0.04) (0.10) (0.13) 
Household has saved in past 
week 
0.41** 0.28 0.88**    0.55 0.20 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.00)    (0.35) (0.28) 
Household has taken loan in 
past year 
0.29* 0.20  -0.01 0.83* 0.16   
 (0.02) (0.15)  (0.98) (0.05) (0.27)   
SHG  0.17   -0.26 0.29 -0.38 0.29 
  (0.25)   (0.54) (0.08) (0.33) (0.09) 
Improved Stove (non-LPG)  0.82*    0.70  0.78* 
  (0.03)    (0.09)  (0.04) 
Household has constant access 
to electricity 
 0.26*   0.54 0.25* 0.54 0.23 
  (0.03)   (0.13) (0.04) (0.12) (0.06) 
SC/ST  -0.07   -1.15** 0.07 -0.05 -0.09 
  (0.55)   (0.01) (0.59) (0.86) (0.50) 
Total Monthly Expenditure  -0.00   -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.85)   (0.55) (0.90) (0.31) (0.78) 
Number of household 
members 
 0.06*   0.12 0.04 -0.09 0.08** 
  (0.03)   (0.22) (0.08) (0.13) (0.00) 
% of household sick in past 
two weeks 
 -0.43   0.14 -0.50 -1.95*** -0.24 
  (0.08)   (0.86) (0.07) (0.00) (0.43) 
Years of Education, Household 
head 
 0.01   0.10** 0.01 -0.00 0.02 
  (0.27)   (0.01) (0.40) (0.92) (0.24) 
Years of Education, Primary 
Cook 
 -0.01   -0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 
  (0.42)   (0.57) (0.39) (0.06) (0.13) 
Save*Rebate 2   -0.61      
   (0.14)      
Save * Rebate 3   -0.78*      
   (0.05)      
Credit * Rebate 2    0.26     
    (0.45)     
Credit * Rebate 3    0.34     
    (0.36)     
Joint test (Chi)   11.46 3.44     
   (0.01) (0.33)     
Constant -0.08 -1.53*** -0.70*** -0.62*** -1.33 -1.60*** -0.66 -1.60*** 
 (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) 
         
Observations 771 722 771 771 80 641 118 603 
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Table 6. Average Marginal Effects on Probability of Type of Stove Purchase (multinomial logit 
regressions) 
Dependent variable Stove Type  dy/dx P-value 
Rebate level     
(1.3) Greenway 
Rebate 2 
Rebate 3 
  
 -0.02 0.89 
 0.04 0.72 
 Gcoil 
Rebate 2 
Rebate 3 
  
 0.29* 0.01 
 0.36*** 0.00 
 Both stoves 
Rebate 2 
Rebate 3 
  
 -0.07 0.49 
 -0.01 0.95 
NGO presence 
(2.5) 
Greenway  0.05** 0.03 
Gcoil  0.07** 0.04 
 Both stoves  -0.02 0.32 
Save / 
Credit 
Greenway    
save 0.04 0.21 
(3.7) credit 0.05*** 0.09 
 Gcoil    
 save 0.10* 0.06 
 credit 0.08* 0.07 
 Both stoves    
 save 0.02 0.32 
 credit -0.02 0.54 
 
 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS & LIMITATIONS OF ANALYSIS 
 
 In this section I consider some potential limitations of this analysis and important policy 
considerations. First, ICS purchase does not immediately entail realization of ICS benefits; sustained 
use is an additional challenge with other, complex barriers that may differ from those associated with 
initial adoption. While this analysis examines the effect of rebates (a delayed subsidy) and substantiates 
their use in promoting ICS purchase, subsidies may not encourage long-term use of health 
technologies (Cole, et al. 2012, Ashraf, et al, 2007). Preliminary evidence from our study suggests a 
similar outcome (Figure A5, Appendix). Thus, subsidies may only induce initial willingness to 
purchase and experimentation, requiring further behavior change programs to encourage long-term 
adoption.  
 
Second, optimally, market supply must equal demand. While this study focuses on stimulating 
household demand for ICS, building a reliable supply of ICS is particularly important for rural areas 
and may require considering customer support and after-sales services programs (Lagarde et al., 2010; 
Lewis et al, 2014; Rehfuess et al., 2014). As small-scale, market-based supply chains grow, they face a 
range of challenges. Small emerging social businesses in developing countries encounter challenging 
environments, facing weak lending markets, high corruption, and low institutional support (Bialis et 
al., 2009). When further challenged with low ICS demand and a market distorted by subsidies, local 
market-based supply chains may flounder.  
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Third, as suggested by this study, NGOs serve as an important institutional complement to 
market-based supply that leverages local networks of trust and contextual knowledge. Beyond the time 
limited programs and support of external aid organizations, local NGOs are key to ICS adoption over 
time. Nevertheless, relying on NGOs for ICS supply over private market delivery brings tradeoffs. In 
terms of efficiency, private sector service delivery has shown improved performance over public and 
non-profit supply of water and electricity services (Gassner et al., 2008). Further, NGOs’ dependency 
on donor funding may make them less performance-driven (Edwards & Hulme, 1996) and no longer 
institutions driving an autonomous development agenda (Townsend et al., 2004). Donors, 
alternatively, represent potential avenues for supporting subsidy-driven demand interventions, but 
only if consistent funding can be secured and reporting burdens can be met by NGOs. 
Implementation itself should be tested in each context to further identify additional barriers to stove 
purchase and sustained use before a large stove intervention is taken to scale.  
 
Unlike previous ICS promotion studies, I find that there is a high demand for improved 
stoves, especially with substantial ‘use-related’ rebates. Deliberate experimentation with various 
rebates provides further understanding of price elasticities, which may guide planning and marketing.  
Household-level characteristics, including savings and credit, and community attributes, such as 
presence of NGOs, may additionally help targeting of future ICS sales campaigns. However, beyond 
understanding the incentives that drive ICS purchase and use, it is important to consider and build 
evidence for health and social impacts, delivery, and sustained use of ICS. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Normal Difference Tests: Randomized Treatment and Control groups 
 Mean: Mean: Difference: N: N: 
 Treatment Control Normalized Treatmen
t 
Control 
Transit Facilities 0.47 0.69 0.31 795 259 
Presence of Paved Roads 0.26 0.42 0.24 795 259 
Distance to Nearest Doctor 9.43 9.41 0.00 766 230 
Presence of Bank Facilities 0.34 0.27 -0.09 795 259 
Presence of NGO (Chirag) 0.49 0.53 0.06 793 266 
HH owns improved stove 0.28 0.41 0.20 773 261 
HH owns improved stove (non-LPG) 0.02 0.05 0.09 795 266 
Minutes of use (clean stove) per day 38.19 64.30 0.19 795 266 
Fuelwood (kg) 6.92 6.58 -0.04 776 255 
HH has taken loan in past year 0.13 0.19 0.11 795 266 
Household size 4.80 4.91 0.03 795 266 
Female Head of Household 0.26 0.30 0.07 785 263 
Hours of Electricity per day 17.22 17.15 -0.01 767 253 
Believes Stoves have medium or better 
impact 0.29 0.30 0.01 795 266 
HH owns traditional stove 0.98 0.96 -0.07 795 266 
HH uses improved fuel 0.34 0.48 0.21 795 266 
HH uses improved fuel (non-LPG) 0.13 0.22 0.17 795 266 
Minutes of use (clean stove, non-LPG) 
per day 2.17 4.29 0.07 795 266 
Minutes of use (traditional stove) per day 296.94 286.16 -0.05 795 266 
Total Fuel Expenditure (natural log) 5.61 5.82 0.14 348 148 
BPL 0.56 0.59 0.05 774 254 
Household has saved in the past year 0.10 0.11 0.00 795 266 
Presence of improved toilet (own, 
neighbor, community) 0.84 0.89 0.10 795 266 
Owns cellphone 1.27 1.40 0.10 794 266 
Total HH expenditure (natural log) 8.40 8.43 0.03 771 258 
Self-Assessed wealth (5 point scale) 2.08 2.26 0.15 793 266 
HH uses electricity for light 0.93 0.95 0.05 795 266 
SCST 0.23 0.32 0.15 795 266 
Scheduled Caste 0.22 0.32 0.16 795 266 
Scheduled Tribe 0.01 0.00 -0.04 795 266 
% of households sick in past two weeks 0.07 0.08 0.02 795 266 
HH believes smoke is unsafe 0.50 0.48 -0.04 795 266 
Head of Household education (years) 5.84 5.58 -0.04 779 262 
Primary Cook education (years) 4.56 4.75 0.03 770 259 
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Table A2. Normalized difference tests by rebate group 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Normalized Differences by Rebate group:  
Rebate 1 (Rs. 25) vs. Rebate 2 (Rs. 200) & 3 (Rs. 450) 
  
 Mean: Mean: Difference: N: N: 
 Rebate 2 & 3 Rebate 1 Difference Rebate 2 & 
3 
Rebate 1 
HH size 4.72 4.87 0.05 516 255 
Head Years of Edu 5.84 5.87 0.00 506 251 
Female Head 0.24 0.29 0.07 510 252 
HH believes ICS impacts 
beneficial 0.31 0.29 -0.04 
516 255 
Cold Cough, 2 wks 0.23 0.20 -0.05 516 255 
Total Mins cooking (both 
stoves) 340.35 332.09 -0.04 
516 255 
Mins cooking (traditional) 285.84 289.61 0.02 516 255 
Mins cooking (ICS) 49.62 42.48 -0.05 516 255 
ICS ownership 0.33 0.30 -0.04 501 252 
Logged Total Fuel Expenditure  5.67 5.73 0.04 247 114 
Hours of Electricity per day 16.66 17.68 0.10 498 242 
Chirag – NGO presence 0.54 0.49 -0.07 516 255 
Cellphone ownership 0.81 0.87 0.11 516 255 
Total rooms in house 4.72 4.68 -0.01 516 252 
Presence of toilet 0.84 0.84 0.00 516 255 
Owns/leases agricultural land 0.98 0.98 0.00 506 247 
Relative wealth 2.14 2.09 -0.05 514 255 
Taken loan in past year 0.18 0.12 -0.12 516 255 
Saved money in past year 0.13 0.07 -0.12 516 255 
Total expenditure (natural log) 8.43 8.40 -0.03 499 248 
Most risk-taking respondent 0.44 0.42 -0.02 508 250 
Most patient respondent 0.50 0.50 0.00 506 248 
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Rebate 2 (Rs. 200) vs. Rebate 1 (Rs. 25) & Rebate 3 (Rs. 450)  
 Mean: Mean: Normalized N: N: 
 Rebate 1 & 3 Rebate 2 Difference Rebate 
1 & 3 
Rebate 
2 
HH size 4.83 4.65 -0.06 512 259 
Head Years of Edu 5.72 6.10 0.06 502 255 
Female Head 0.28 0.20 -0.13 505 257 
HH believes ICS impacts 
beneficial 0.30 0.31 0.01 512 259 
Cold Cough, 2 wks 0.22 0.22 0.01 512 259 
Total Mins cooking (both stoves) 337.03 338.78 0.01 512 259 
Mins cooking (traditional) 286.24 288.78 0.01 512 259 
Mins cooking (ICS) 47.51 46.76 -0.01 512 259 
ICS ownership 0.32 0.32 0.01 503 250 
Logged Total Fuel Expenditure  5.75 5.58 -0.11 240 121 
Hours of Electricity per day 17.25 16.50 -0.07 488 252 
Chirag – NGO presence 0.53 0.52 -0.01 512 259 
Cellphone ownership 0.84 0.81 -0.06 512 259 
Total rooms in house 4.69 4.73 0.01 509 259 
Presence of toilet 0.84 0.85 0.02 512 259 
Owns/leases agricultural land 0.98 0.98 0.00 497 256 
Relative wealth 2.13 2.11 -0.02 511 258 
Taken loan in past year 0.16 0.16 0.01 512 259 
Saved money in past year 0.10 0.14 0.09 512 259 
Total expenditure (natural log) 8.41 8.44 0.03 494 253 
Most risk-taking respondent 0.41 0.47 0.09 504 254 
Most patient respondent 0.51 0.49 -0.02 501 253 
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Rebate 3 (Rs. 450) vs. Rebate 1 (Rs. 25) & 2 (Rs. 200)   
 Mean: Mean: Normalized N: N: 
 Rebate 1 
& 2 
Rebate 3 Difference Rebate 1 
& 2 
Rebat
e 3 
HH size 4.76 4.79 0.01 523 248 
Head Years of Edu 5.93 5.67 -0.04 515 242 
Female Head 0.25 0.26 0.02 518 244 
HH believes ICS impacts 
beneficial 0.29 0.33 0.05 523 248 
Cold Cough, 2 wks 0.21 0.24 0.05 523 248 
Total Mins cooking (both stoves) 336.12 340.79 0.02 523 248 
Mins cooking (traditional) 290.18 280.58 -0.05 523 248 
Mins cooking (ICS) 44.33 53.44 0.07 523 248 
ICS ownership 0.31 0.34 0.04 511 242 
Logged Total Fuel Expenditure  5.64 5.80 0.11 241 120 
Hours of Electricity per day 17.03 16.90 -0.01 503 237 
Chirag – NGO presence 0.51 0.56 0.07 523 248 
Cellphone ownership 0.84 0.82 -0.04 523 248 
Total rooms in house 4.71 4.70 0.00 520 248 
Presence of toilet 0.85 0.84 -0.02 523 248 
Owns/leases agricultural land 0.98 0.98 -0.01 512 241 
Relative wealth 2.10 2.19 0.08 522 247 
Taken loan in past year 0.14 0.21 0.13 523 248 
Saved money in past year 0.11 0.11 0.01 523 248 
Total expenditure (natural log) 8.41 8.43 0.02 510 237 
Most risk-taking respondent 0.45 0.40 -0.08 513 245 
Most patient respondent 0.50 0.50 0.01 510 244 
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Rebate 1 (Rs. 25) vs. Rebate 2 (Rs. 200)    
 Mean: Mean: Normalized N: N: 
 Rebate 2 Rebate 1 Difference Rebate 
2 
Rebate 1 
HH size 4.65 4.88 0.08 268 255 
Head Years of Edu 6.00 5.87 -0.02 264 251 
Female Head 0.22 0.29 0.11 266 252 
HH believes ICS impacts beneficial 0.30 0.29 -0.02 268 255 
Cold Cough, 2 wks 0.22 0.20 -0.04 268 255 
Total Mins cooking (both stoves) 339.94 332.09 -0.04 268 255 
Mins cooking (traditional) 290.72 289.61 -0.01 268 255 
Mins cooking (ICS) 46.09 42.48 -0.03 268 255 
ICS ownership 0.32 0.30 -0.03 259 252 
Logged Total Fuel Expenditure  5.55 5.73 0.11 127 114 
Hours of Electricity per day 16.44 17.68 0.12 261 242 
Chirag – NGO presence 0.53 0.49 -0.05 268 255 
Cellphone ownership 0.81 0.87 0.12 268 255 
Total rooms in house 4.73 4.68 -0.01 268 252 
Presence of toilet 0.85 0.84 -0.01 268 255 
Owns/leases agricultural land 0.99 0.98 -0.01 265 247 
Relative wealth 2.10 2.09 -0.01 267 255 
Taken loan in past year 0.16 0.12 -0.08 268 255 
Saved money in past year 0.14 0.08 -0.15 268 255 
Total expenditure (natural log) 8.42 8.40 -0.03 262 248 
Most risk-taking respondent 0.47 0.42 -0.07 263 250 
Most patient respondent 0.50 0.50 0.00 262 248 
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Rebate 1 (Rs. 25) vs. Rebate 3 (Rs. 450)    
 Mean: Mean: Normalized N: N: 
 Rebate 3 Rebate 1 Difference Rebate 
3 
Rebate 1 
HH size 4.78 4.88 0.03 257 255 
Head Years of Edu 5.58 5.87 0.05 251 251 
Female Head 0.28 0.29 0.01 253 252 
HH believes ICS impacts beneficial 0.32 0.29 -0.04 257 255 
Cold Cough, 2 wks 0.23 0.20 -0.06 257 255 
Total Mins cooking (both stoves) 341.93 332.09 -0.04 257 255 
Mins cooking (traditional) 282.89 289.61 0.03 257 255 
Mins cooking (ICS) 52.50 42.48 -0.07 257 255 
ICS ownership 0.33 0.30 -0.04 251 252 
Logged Total Fuel Expenditure  5.76 5.73 -0.02 126 114 
Hours of Electricity per day 16.82 17.68 0.08 246 242 
Chirag – NGO presence 0.56 0.49 -0.10 257 255 
Cellphone ownership 0.81 0.87 0.10 257 255 
Total rooms in house 4.70 4.68 -0.01 257 252 
Presence of toilet 0.83 0.84 0.02 257 255 
Owns/leases agricultural land 0.98 0.98 0.00 250 247 
Relative wealth 2.18 2.09 -0.08 256 255 
Taken loan in past year 0.20 0.12 -0.16 257 255 
Saved money in past year 0.12 0.08 -0.10 257 255 
Total expenditure (natural log) 8.42 8.40 -0.02 246 248 
Most risk-taking respondent 0.40 0.42 0.04 254 250 
Most patient respondent 0.51 0.50 -0.01 253 248 
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Rebate 2 (Rs. 200) vs. Rebate 3 (Rs. 450)    
 Mean: Mean: Normalized N: N: 
 Rebate 3 Rebate 2 Difference Rebate 3 Rebate 2 
HH size 4.78 4.65 -0.04 257 259 
Head Years of Edu 5.58 6.10 0.08 251 255 
Female Head 0.28 0.20 -0.12 253 257 
HH believes ICS impacts beneficial 0.32 0.31 -0.01 257 259 
Cold Cough, 2 wks 0.23 0.22 -0.02 257 259 
Total Mins cooking (both stoves) 341.93 338.78 -0.01 257 259 
Mins cooking (traditional) 282.89 288.78 0.03 257 259 
Mins cooking (ICS) 52.50 46.76 -0.04 257 259 
ICS ownership 0.33 0.32 -0.01 251 250 
Logged Total Fuel Expenditure  5.76 5.58 -0.12 126 121 
Hours of Electricity per day 16.82 16.50 -0.03 246 252 
Chirag – NGO presence 0.56 0.52 -0.06 257 259 
Cellphone ownership 0.81 0.81 -0.01 257 259 
Total rooms in house 4.70 4.73 0.01 257 259 
Presence of toilet 0.83 0.85 0.03 257 259 
Owns/leases agricultural land 0.98 0.98 0.00 250 256 
Relative wealth 2.18 2.11 -0.06 256 258 
Taken loan in past year 0.20 0.16 -0.07 257 259 
Saved money in past year 0.12 0.14 0.04 257 259 
Total expenditure (natural log) 8.42 8.44 0.02 246 253 
Most risk-taking respondent 0.40 0.47 0.11 254 254 
Most patient respondent 0.51 0.49 -0.02 253 253 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3. Stove sales by rebate level 
 Rebate 1 
Rs. 25 
Rebate 2 
Rs. 200 
Rebate 3 
Rs. 400 
Households 
purchasing stove(s) 
 
68 
  
139 
 
179 
  
255 
 
259 
 
248 
N    
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Table A4. Pair Wise Correlations, Household expenditure and wealth covariates 
 Monthly HH 
expenditure 
Monthly Expenditure 
(natural log) 
Number of 
household members 
Stove Bought -0.01 -0.00 .09** 
Hours of Electricity per 
day 
0.11** .17*** .10** 
Improved water source -0.02 .03 -.05 
Village size -0.01 0.07* -.01 
Improved stove 
ownership (non-LPG) 
 
0.54 
 
0.16 
 
.03 
 
 
 
Figure A5. Preliminary Results of Follow-up survey (Duke/USAID Randomized control trial): Stove 
Purchase and Use, Treatment group only 
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